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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
oF· THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, also known 
as BILL CHRISTENSEN and CELESTE 
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EMERON CHRISTENSEN and KATHLEEN 
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
Civil 
No. 8966 
This action was brought by the plaintiffs William Chris-
tensen and his wife, Celeste Christensen against Emeron 
Christensen and his wife, Kathleen Christensen, defendants-
appellants herein, to require the specific performance of two 
alleged oral contracts as hereinafter stated. The defendants-
appellants answered denying the existence of such contracts 
8,nd set up the statute of frauds and statute of limitations 
as defenses thereto. 
The matter was tried before the Court at Richfield, 
Sevier County, Utah, on October 21 and 22, 1957, and the 
Court after taking the matter under advisement, entered its 
Decision on May 29, 1958, £or the plaintiffs and against the 
defendants and subsequently denied defendants' Motion for 
New Trial. 
It is from this decision that the defendants now appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Complaint was first brought by the plaintiff, William 
Christensen on Sept. 7, 1956 against the defendant Emeron 
Christensen, alleging that during the year 1942 the defen-
dant, Emeron Christensen sold two tracts of real property 
in Sevier County, Utah, one tract containing 8 acres and one 
tract containing 2 acres, to the plaintiff for the sum of 
$1000.00 to be paid upon an installment basis (no definite 
time being set up in the complaint for such payments) and 
without interest, such payments to be made in the form of 
credits against the purchase price for services to be rendered 
by the plaintiff to the defendant and for certain livestock 
to be furnished defendant by plaintiff, and that to the date 
of the filing of the complaint services and livestock had been 
furnished to the extent of $684.00, and that plaintiff owed a 
balance of $316.00 which he was ready and willing to pay. 
The complaint further alleged that the plaintiff went into 
possession of this property in 1942 and that he and his 
lessees were in possession of same up to and including the 
crop year of 1955 and that beginning with the crop year of 
1956 he was dispossessed by the defendant. And further 
alleged that during his occupancy he improved the ground 
by fertilizing, leveling, and repairing fences. (R A-1) 
The defendant answered the complaint and denied the 
existence of the contract and set up that although the al-
leged contract was for the sale of lands, no note or memo-
randum thereof was ever made in writing expressing the 
consideration and terms, subscribed by the defendant or any 
authorized agent of the defendant, and that the alleged con-
tract was not performed within one year from the date of 
the alleged making and is void by reason of the Statute of 
Frauds. (R A-23) 
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Thereafter the matter was set for trial to begin on 
March 22, 1957 at 10 A.M. (R A-26) but was thereafter post-
poned and on April 2, 1957, counsel for plaintiff filed a mo-
tjon to amend the complaint and f.or joinder of additional 
party defendant and party plaintiff which was granted by 
the court (R A-28) and an Amended Complaint was there-
upon filed joining Celeste Christensen, the wife of plaintiff, 
as a party plaintiff, and Kathleen Christensen, the wife of 
defendant, as a party defendant. The Amended Complaint 
set up a Second Cause of Action in which it was alleged that 
during the year 1942 the plaintiffs and defendants entered 
into another oral agreement whereby it was agreed that the 
plaintiffs would convey to defendants 35 acres of real prop-
erty they owned in Sevier County, Utah, with 171;2 shares 
of Elsinore Irrigation Canal Company water, in consideration 
for the conveyance by Defendants~ to Plaintiff Celeste Chris-
tensen of 15 acres of real property in Sevier County, Utah, 
owned by defendant Kathleen Christensen, plus 221j2 shares 
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water stock, and as a 
further consideration to the deal the defendants agreed to 
assume and discharge a certain financial obligation then 
owed by the plaintiffs to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley. 
The plaintiffs then allege that all of the contract had been 
performed save and except the defendants had failed and 
refused to transfer and deliver to plaintiffs the 22112 shares 
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water stock. (R A-37) 
Defendants answered the First Cause of Action of the 
Amended Complaint denying they had ever entered into such 
oral contract and again setting up the statute of frauds, and 
entered a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Second Cause of Ac-
tion, which motion was overruled by the court. (R A-49) 
(R A-53) The defendants then answered the Second Cause 
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of Action denying they had ever agreed to such transaction 
so far as the transfer of 22V2 shares of Sevier Valley Irriga-
tion Water stock was concerned, and further setting up that 
this cause of action was barred by reason of the statute of 
limitations. (R A-54) 
The testimony as to the contracts claimed by the plain-
tiffs and the denial thereof by the defendants is as follows: 
The plaintiff, William Christensen, testified in sub-
stance as follows: 
In the spring of the year 1942 he had a convers-
ation with the defendant Emeron Cbx\stensen which 
took place in the plaintiff's stack yarJ and he and the 
defendant were the only persons present and at that 
time the defendant offered to trade land. The plain-
tiff then said if the defendant would give him clear 
title on his home, 15 acres of farming ground, and 
221f2 shares of Sevier Valley Water, he would give 
the defendant 35 acres of land and 17¥2 shares of 
Elsinore water. (R 15-18) And at that time the de-
fendant said he would sell his 10 acre tract (the 8 
and 2 acre tract as described in the First Cause of 
Action) to the plaintiff for $1000.00 ($100.00 per 
acre) but this transaction was not a part of the other 
transaction involving the trading of lands· and water. 
(R 15 to 18) The defendant told him he could pay 
as they went along and haul his beet pulp to the 
sugar factory and deliver livestock. That two or 
three days after the date this conversation took place 
the plaintiff took defendant a bay mare and in the 
fall of 1942 he delivered other animals to the defen-
dant and that his wife kept track of these transac-
tions in a note book. That he hauled 255 tons of beet 
pulp for defendant at $1.50 per ton in the fall of 1943 
and spring of 1944. (R 19 to 28) 
Then in June of 1942 the defendant and his· wife 
called at the home of plaintiff in Richfield, Utah, 
when they brought the plaintiffs the deed to their 
home released by the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, 
the deed to the 15 acre tract and abstracts on the 10 
acre tract, and the defendants then received from 
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plaintiffs the deed to the 34 acre tract and 171;2 
shares of water in the Elsinore Canal Company and 
that plaintiff asked the defendant Emeron Christen-
sen when he was going to get the deeds on the 8 and 
2 acre tracts and defendant answered 'You have got 
it just about paid for. I'll fix it all up with you, your 
water stock and your deeds and you can finish pay-
ing me for it.' (R 29 to 31) 
That in the spring ·of 1943 he had another con-
versation with the defendant, Emeron Christensen 
at his farm and that the defendant Emeron Chris-
tensen said he had been too busy to get things fixed 
but would do so right away. (R 32) 
That he had another ·conversation with defen-
dant before 1950 at his home in Richfield when the 
defendants called to get plaintiff to transfer a cattle 
permit he was holding for defendant and when asked 
when he was going to fix up plaintiffs' property, de-
fendant said 'Any time.' " (R 34) 
The defendant, Emeron Christensen testified in sub-
stance as follows : 
"That he never had any oral agreement with 
plaintiff for the sale of the 8 and 2 acre tracts and 
never agreed to sell him that property for $100.00 
per acre. That he heard plaintiff testify he was to 
buy that property and work it out, sell livestock and 
apply it and have all the time he wanted without 
interest. Defendant denied that this was the truth. 
(R 119) Defendant said the arrangement he did 
have with the plaintiff was this: Plaintiffs had their 
home, 111;2 shares of water stock in Sevier Valley 
Canal Co. and their farm mortgaged to Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley. Defendant agreed to pay off the 
balance on the mortgage in the sum of some $2300.00 
which would release plaintiffs' home, their water 
stock and farm, and deed plaintiff a 15 acre tract of 
farming ground which could be watered under the 
Sevier Valley canal and on which plaintiff could use 
his 111;2 shares of Sevier Valley water, in considera-
tion for the plaintiffs deeding to defendants a 34 
acre tract with 171;2 shares Elsinore Canal Water. 
That this completed the transaction and there was 
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never any agreement on defendants' part to further 
transfer to plaintiffs 221f2 shares of Sevier Valley 
water. (R 127 - 128) 
With regard to the 8 and 2 acre tracts, defen-
dant let the plaintiff farm this during the years 1942 
to 1955 with the use of such water of defendants as 
plaintiff helped himself to. Water was never turned 
to defendant but he us~ed such water of defendant's 
stream as he needed. He did this to help plaintiff 
out and let him have the land for the payment -of th2 
taxes thereon. That a reasonable rental value for 
the land would be about $40.00 per acre. That the 
value of the land in 1942 would have been in excess 
of $100.00 per acre, and that defendant had bought a 
like amount of land 1f2 mile south of this tract at 
that time for $3000.00. He said the plaintiff had 
never asked him to convey the 8 and 2 acre tracts as 
it was understood he was just farming it. He de-
nied receiving the livestock as testified to by plain-
tiffs, and denied the plaintiffs having any credit by 
reason of hauling pulp, potatoes or coal, for which 
he had not been paid. (R 120 to 136) 
That during all of this time plaintiffs never paid 
any of the water assessments on the 221f2 shares of 
Sevier Valley water stock they now claim, but all of 
such assessments were paid by the defendant." (R 
121 - 122) 
As to the improvements placed on the property during 
the years plaintiff farmed it, the plaintiff testified: 
That in 1943 and 44 he manured the ground 
(R 49) That in the fall of 1945 and spring of 1946 
he had the land leveled at a cost of $300.00 which he 
paid the Otter Creek Reservoir Co. under a coopera-
tive plan which included his 15 acre tract also. (R 51-
52) He also paid the County $85.00 on a touch up 
j.ob that year (R 53). He repaired the fences to the 
extent of replacing 1f2 dozen posts and new wiring 
the cost of which he didn't say. (R 54) He worked 
three weeks on improving a County Road to the prop-
erty in 1943 or 44. (R 54 - 55) 
As to the improvements, on the land in question the de-
fendant testified: 
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That the ground at present time has to be lev-
eled-that it is almost impossible to irrigate. That 
the fences are like they always have been, posts 
sticking up here and there and loose wire. (R 126) 
That the County Road plaintiff testified he worked 
on runs for about a mile and serves plaintiff's other 
piece of ground as well as the ground in dispute, and 
land belonging to others and it is a County Road and 
not on the property in dispute. (R 129 - 130) 
After the trial of the action was concluded in October of 
1957, the Court took the matter under advisement and in 
April of 1958 called counsel for plaintiffs and for the defen-
dants to his office and stated he wished to obtain some addi-
tional facts before rendering a decision. It was the under-
standing of counsel for defendants that any such additional 
facts· to be submitted would be submitted by a stipulation by 
counsel for all of the parties. On May 14, 1958, a letter was 
written to the Court by counsel for the plaintiffs (R 173 - 4) 
in which a detailed statement of principal and interest on 
the Federal Land Bank loan of plaintiffs was set forth pur-
porting to be information received from the Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley, and further submitting valuations on land 
and water rights involved in this action..:. 
Counsel for defendants took exception to such letter and 
procedure and wrote the Court on May 20, 1958 (R 175) to 
the effect that any evidential information to be submitted 
should be submitted by stipulation between counsel and made 
a part of the record. 
Notwithstanding this objection another letter was writ-
ten to the Court on May 23, 1958 (R 176) by counsel for 
plaintiffs with further estimates and valuations. 
And the Court thereafter on May 29, 1958, entered his 
decision in this matter. (R 155- 6) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE 
EVIDENCE. 
(a) Evidence was Insufficient to Prove the Existence of 
a Contract on Either Cause of Action. 
(b) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed Terms 
were too Uncertain to Entitle Specific Performance. 
(c) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed It was 
Within the.Statute of Frauds. 
(d) Second Cause of Action was Barred by Statute of 
Limitations and Statute of Frauds. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RE-
QUESTING AND RECEIVING FROM PLAINTIFFS' 
COUNSEL, LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF EVI-
DENCE AFTER THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION, AND 
OBJECTED TO BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS. 
Ill. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO 
LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
(a) Evidence was Insufficient to Prove the Existence 
of a Contract on Either Cause of Action. 
The law is well settled that before specific performance 
can be decreed the existence of the contract must be estab-
lished by clear and satisfactory evidence and that a greater 
amount or degree of certainty is required in the terms of an 
agreement which is to be specifically executed in equity, than 
is necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an ac-
tion at law for damages. 1 
1 See Pomroy's Specific Performance of Contracts, 2nd Ed. No. 
159 and also as quoted in Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P. 2nd, 
853, and also in Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P. 2nd 161. 
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Our Utah Court has held that there can be no contract 
unless the minds of the parties have met and have mutually 
agreed. This was true in the case of Montgomery v. Berrett, 
40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569 wherein it was held: 
"Plaintiff seeking the specific performance of 
a parole contract must establish the terms thereof 
with a greater degree of certainty than is required 
in an action at law, and he must show a clear, mu-
tual understanding and a positive assent of both par-
ties to the terms of the contract." 
and Justice Frick states at page 570 of the Pacific report: 
"(1) It is now well settled that, where a party 
seeks specific performance of a parol contract in 
equity, he must establish the terms thereof with a 
greater degree of certainty than would be required 
to establish the same contract in an action at law. 
Pomeroy on Conts. (2d Ed) No. 159. Referring to 
this question, the Supreme Court of California, in a 
recent case, entiled German Svgs. & Loan Soc. v. Me 
LeHan, 1954 Cal. at page 716, 99 P. at page 196, 
states the rule in the following language: 'There can 
be no contract, unless the minds of the parties have 
met and have mutually agreed. Equity requires as a 
condition of specific performance a clear, mutual 
understanding and a positive assent of both sides as 
to the terms of the contract.' " 
"In 36 Cyc. 543, in speaking of the essentials of 
a contract which is enforceable in an action for spe-
cific performance, it is said: 'In general, the contract 
must have the essentials of a contract valid and bind-
ing at law, in order to be enforceable in equity. It 
must be a completed contract; there must have been 
a clear, mutual understanding and a positive assent 
on both sides as to the terms of the contract. It must 
be sufficient, definite and certain. * * * '" 
Practically the same rule is laid down by Mr. Justice 
Straup in Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah, 86, 86 Pac. 768, for at page 
772 of the Pacific Report he says: 
"* * * In order to ingraft this exception onto the 
statute of frauds, which requires that a conveyance 
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of lands must be evidenced by a memorandum in 
writing there should, in addition to the fact of pos 
session and making of improvements, be clear and 
conclusive proof of the contract, its scope and terms. 
(bold face ours) The object of the statute of frauds 
is to prevent the transfer of titles to lands 'on loos8 
and indeterminate proofs of what ought to be estab-
lished by solemn written contracts.' Taylor v. Ash-
ley, 15 Tex. 50. In order to sustain a verbal contract 
for the sale of land, of course, it is abs•olutely neees-
sary to prove the verbal contract either by direct or 
circumstantial evidence; and this must be accompa-
nied by proof of possession and strong equities· inde-
pendent of the contract." 
And a California case, Weisbrod v. Weisbrod, 81 P. 2d 
633, 27 Cal. App. 2d 712, held: "Without mutuality, no spe-
cific performance of an asseted agreement can be decreed." 
And in another Utah case, Ward v. Ward, 85 P. 2d, 635, 
96 Utah 263, it was held: 
"To entitle a party to specific performance of a 
contract, the contract must in all respects be fair, 
just and reasonable, and the compensations must be 
mutual." 
and 
"To entitle a party to specific performance, the 
contract must be attended with all the attributes of 
fairness and honesty as will appeal to the conscience 
of the chancellor, and the terms of the contract may 
not be pieced out of oral testimony underlain and 
contradictory in nature." 
The situation that we have in the case at bar, before 
the Court can consider whether the alleged contract is within 
the statute of frauds or is taken out by part performance, is 
then whether or not a contract actually existed. Did the 
defendant agree to sell to the plaintiffs, and if so what were 
the terms of the contracts? 
Inasmuch as the first and second causes of action are 
separate tranactions (R 18-19) testimony as to the alleged 
10 
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sale of the lands involved in the first cause of action should 
be considered as was given by the plaintiff, William Chris-
tensen who testified that in the spring of 1942 the defendant 
Emeron Christensen met him at his (the plaintiff's stack 
yard and agreed to sell him the two tracts of land compris-
ing 10 acres for $100.00 per acre, and that plaintiff could 
pay defendant in livestock and services any way he wanted 
to, without interest. There was no time set for any of the 
payments. The plaintiff could pay just what he wanted any 
time he wanted and for as long a time as he wanted. Accord-
ing to" plaintiff's testimony the contract could have gone on 
forever, and the defendant would have had no action against 
the plaintiff for non payment etc. 
The testimony of plaintiff in court as to the time and 
place of the making of the alleged contract was contradictory 
to the· sworn answers of the plaintiff to the written inter-
rogatories of the plaintiff on file in the· action. In his sworn 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 the plaintiff said: 
"The defendant Emeron Christensen offered to sell 
the said 8.00acre tract of real property described in 
Plaintiff's Complaint to the plaintiff * * *on numer-
ous occasions during the spring, summer and fall of 
the year 1942. * * * The said representations were 
made on the said J.'leal property involved in this case 
and at the home of the defendant Emeron Christen-
sen at Elsinore, Utah. The plaintiff and the defenr-
dant and the wife of tbe plaintiff, Celesta Christen-
sen, were present at the time said representations 
were made." (bold face ours) (R A-15) 
Plaintiff's answer to Iterrogatory No. 4 was: 
"The negotiations for the sale and purchase of the 
10.0 acre tract of property described in plaintiff's 
complaint transpired over a p;eriod of several months 
during the spring, summer and fall of the year 1942. 
The plaintiff and the defendant were pres~ent at the 
time said negotiations were completed and the oral 
11 
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agreement was reached for the sale and purchase of 
said 10.0 acre tract of real property." (bold face 
ours) (R A-16) 
The plaintiff's testimony in Court was somewhat differ-
ent. He testified that the defendant offered to sell only the 
one time, at his (the plaintiff's stack yard) in the spring of 
1942, and that only he and the defendant were present. (R 
60 and 66) 
The plaintiff introduced a number of pulp receipts tend-
ing to substantiate his claim that he hauled beet pulp for 
the defendant during the fall of 1943 and spring of 1944. 
Some were in the defendant Emeron Christensen's name and 
some were in other names. The plaintiff claims he was not 
paid for this labor by the defendant and that the same was 
to apply on the purchase price of the property at the rate of 
$1.50 per ton, but the receipts in themselves do not show a 
credit by Emeron Christensen to the plaintiff, and there is 
no memorandum in writing or other substantive evidence to 
show that defendant ever agreed to pay defendant $1.50 per 
ton for hauling beet pulp, or that he had any credit from 
defendant for such purported services whatsoever. 
The plaintiffs also introduced in evidence a certain ac-
count book in which the plaintiff, Celeste Christensen, had 
noted certain livestock purportedly sold to defendant during 
the years 1943 to 1944, for which plaintiffs claimed credits 
en the purchase price of the land in question. These nota-
tions were made by plaintiff Celeste Christensen and there 
was no notations by the defendants that same were to be 
credited on any contract of sale. The defendant flatly denied 
such were credits or that he received any livestock from 
plaintiffs. 
So here we have a situation of an oral contract claimed 
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to have been made with all of the terms and conditions there-
of being alleged by the plaintiffs, all the credits on purchase 
price being also alleged by plaintiffs, with not so much as 
one receipt or the scratch of a pen to show the existence of 
the contract by the defendants, or the credit or payment 
thereon of services or livestock by the defendants'. 
Defendant testified that during the years in question he 
let the plaintiff, his brother, farm this ground because it 
was situate where he didn't have other farming gl'lound and 
let him use the ground if he would keep it up and pay the 
taxes each year and he terminated such arrangement when 
he bought adjoining property in 1955. 
And as to plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, under an 
Amended Complaint filed some seven months after the first 
Complaint was made, wherein they allege they were to have 
22¥2 shares of Sevier Valley Water stock under an exchange 
agreement (also oral) entered into between the parties on 
the same day (the spring of 1942), the defendants denied 
plaintiffs were to have this water under any agreement ever 
made but admitted there was an agreement for exchange of 
lands and water which had been fully consummated. No 
evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement of defendants 
to give plaintiffs 221/2 shares of water in the Sevier Valley 
Canal Company, was introduced, other than the plaintiffs' 
testimony. 
(b) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed 
Terms were too Uncertain to Entitle Spe·cific Performance. 
Assuming that the plaintiffs' oral contract did exist, 
did it meet the test of sufficiency to entitle it to be specific:., 
ally performed? We think not. Specific performance will 
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not be decreed where the contract is incomplete, uncertain 
or indefinite. z 
If the plaintiffs are to be believed, the defendant Em-
eron Christensen agreed to sell the premises, but there was 
no fixed amounts of payments or time for payment. The 
plaintiff, William Christensen said he could pay in labor and 
services at any time he wanted. (R 61) There was no spe-
cific place, terms or time of payment. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 81, page 493; sets forth 
the following on Time and Place of Payment or Perform-
ance: 
" ( 1) In General. In order to warrant a decree of 
specific performance thereof, a contract must be 
reasonably definite and certain with respect to the 
time, place and manner of payment or performance. 
Specific enf.orcement of a contract may be precluded 
by indefiniteness and uncertainty as to duration or 
as to the time for performance or the time or terms 
of payment. Likewise, the place of performance or 
paym·ent must be stated with sufficient certainty or 
definiteness or be capable of ascertainment from the 
contract." (bold face ours) 
****** (2) Failure to State Time. Where it is the inten-
tion of the parties to defer payment, but no provision 
is made as to the time of payment, the uncertainty 
is fatal; but mere failure to fix a time for payment 
will not prevent specific performance where deferred 
payment was not contemplated. Where payment by 
lthe terms of the oontract is to be def,erred, but the time of payment is not specified, the uncertainty is fatal. Likewise, it is held in some, but not other jur-
isdictions that where a mortgage is to be given, a 
failure to state when it shall mature or be payable 
2 See Dodge Bros. v. Williams Estate Co. 52 Nev. 364, 287 P. 282, 
283, wherein it was held: ''There is no better established principle 
of equity jurisprudence than that specific performance will not be 
decreed when the contract is incomplete, uncertain or indefinite." 
14 
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renders the contract so indefinite and uncertain as 
to defeat specific performance. * * *" (bold face 
ours) 
If a purported agreement is too indefinite to ascertain 
the intention of the parties, it cannot be enforced; not for 
want of an equitable remedy but because of the absence of 
clear, unmistakable proof of all the essential Terms of a con-
tract. See Buckmaster v. Bertram, 186 Cal. 673, 676, 200 
P. 610. In this case a written contract was involved wherein 
the plaintiff agreed to sell and convey to defendant, and de-
fendant agreed to buy, five parcels of land in a certain tract 
in a county for $1,000, payable "at the times and in the man-
ner hereinafter mentioned, * * * to wit, in the form of a 
mortgage payable to S. and due April3, 1919", and the court 
held this contract too uncertain as to payment of the price 
to be enforceable. 
And the case of Mariposa Commercial & Mining Co. v. 
Peters, et al, reported in 8 P. 2d, 849, decided by the Supreme 
Court of the State of California, held "Agreement giving 
option held incapable of specific performance where silent 
on rate of interest and date of maturity of indebtedness." 
And a Utah case, Olsen v. Gordon et al, reported in 125 
P. 2d, 413, held "An oral contract for the purchase of real 
property must be sufficiently definite and certain so that it 
can be enforced by the court and a partial performance can-
not make up f.or the deficiency in the understanding between 
the parties." 
It was held in the case of Edward H. Snow Development 
Co. v. Oxsheer, 62 N.M. 113, 305 P. 2d, 727, that where bin-
der agreement for the purchase of land provided that bal-
;;o.nce of price was to be paid as lots were released at the 
convenience of the purchaser but no time was set for pay-
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ment of the balance, there was no presumption that a reas-
onable time was intended by the parties and the binder was 
incapable of specific performance, and a court of equity will 
not decree specific performance of a contract which does not 
itself set a time for payment of a deferred balance. 3 
(c) If Contract on First Cause of Action Existed it 
was Within the Statute of Frauds. 
The law relating to the Statute of Frauds is set out in 
25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides: 
"Leases and contracts for interest in lands.-
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing sub-
scribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
in writing.'' 
The alleged contract in this action being one in parol, if 
it exists, is obvious,ly under the statute of frauds and non-
enforceable. The plaintiffs have sought to take the matter 
out of the statute of frauds relying upon part performance 
consisting of (1) alleged part payment and (2) the going 
Into possession of the premises and (3) the making of per-
manent improvements thereon. 
The credits plaintiffs claims on the purchase price were 
as heretofore noted in the sum of $684.00 for services and 
livestock as set forth by them, with a denial thereof by de-
fendants, and no receipts from the defendants for such items 
as credits on purchase price of the land involved. These 
3 Quoting 81 C.J.S. No. 34, p. 493: "Where it is the intention of 
the parties to defer payment but no provision is made as to the 
time of payment, the uncertainty is fatal; but mere failure to fix a 
time for payment will not prevent specific performance where de-
ferred payment was not contemplated." 
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claims for credit on purchase price are nothing more than 
claims by the plaintiffs, denied by defendants, totally un-
corroberated by any outside source, or by any written note 
or memorandum by the defendants. 
The going into possession of the premises was explained 
by defendant Emeron Christensen. He let his brother go 
into possession and farm the ground for keeping it up and 
paying the taxes and he took the property back when such 
arrangement was no longer tenable. 
The case at bar does not involve actual possession and 
permanent improvements in the usual sense. The leveling 
plaintiff said he did was in conjunction with a County 
project and benefitted plaintiff's 15 acre tract as well as the 
10 acres in question. His fence repairs were trivial and his 
work on a County road not contiguous to the property which 
benefited his 15 acre tract and property of others was cer-
tainly not sufficient. Even if the evidence had been clear 
and strong enough to impart life and validity to a contract 
invalid because verbal, the essential requirements for invok-
ing equity are absent. 
The defendants contend these were only ordinary ex-
penditures that were required if plaintiff farmed the land 
and are requirements that are most often assumed and met 
by a lessee when farm renting,· and especially in view .of the 
fact that plaintiffs received the crops, rents and profits 
from said land. The evidence is certainly not clear if they 
benefited the ground in question to any great and substan-
tial extent. The testimony of defendant was that the ground 
had not been permanently· improved and that it still needs 
to be leveled and the fences repaired. 
If the improvements were in fact made by plaintiff, it 
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should be brought to attention that such expenditures would 
be far less than plaintiffs' income from the property during 
the time he used same-fr-om 1942 to 1955, during all of 
these years he received the benefit of the crops thereon, and 
expended only the taxes thereon with such upkeep as would 
be ordinarily necessary. 
There are authorities to the effect that where the im-
provements do not exceed the rental value of the premises 
they will not be regarded as of such a substantial value and 
character as to constitute part performance so as to take the 
case out of the statute of frauds. 4 
In the case at. bar the defendant testified that a fair 
rental for the property in question would be $40.00 an acre 
(R 125) At this rate the rental value of the land for 14 
years would far exceed any purported improvements made 
upon the premises. As Justice Straup said in the case of 
Price v. Lloyd 31 Utah, 86, 86 P. 767, at page 771 of the 
Pacific Reporter: 
"*** Here it is shown that the rental value of the 
land far exceeded the improvements made upon the 
premises. While such fact alone may not be the test 
in determining the character and permanency of the 
improvements, still it is a strong circumstance in 
determining whether the purchaser or donee, who 
made the improvements suffers a loss or injury, if 
the oontract is not specifically performed. For, as 
the authorities say, it must appear that the improve-
ments relied upon as part performance are of a char-
acter permanently beneficial to the land and involv-
ing a sacrifice to him who made them because and 
in reliance of the gift. If he had gained more by the 
4 See Wooldridge v. Hancock, 70 Tex. 18 6 S. W. 818; Schoon-
maker v. Plumer (Ill) 29 N.E. 1114; Buhler v. Trombly (Mich) 102 
N.W. 647; Burns v. Daggett 141 Mass. 368, 6 N.E. 727; Poullain v. 
Poullain, 76 Ga. 420, 4 S.E. 92; Porn. 'Spec. Per. Cont. 2nd Ed. No. 
128, 129. 
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possession and use of the land than he has lost by his 
improvements, or if he has been in fact fully compen-
sated for the improvements, they will not be avail-
able to him as ground for specific performance. Gal-
lagher v. Gallagher (W. Va.) 5 S.E. 297; Browne, St. 
Frauds No. 487-891." 
In the case of Ravarino v. Price (Utah) 260 P. 2d 570 it 
was held: 
"Even if general improvements without possession 
are sufficient to take oral contract to convey outside 
statute of frauds, where possession is lacking court 
must be convinced that no reasonable doubt exists as 
to whether improvements are explainable on some 
basis other than hypothesis of oral contract." 
In 36 Cyc. 670 the rule is stated as follows: 
"If improvements are relied upon, not merely as evi-
dence that an actual possession was taken, but as an 
additional, independent ground for specific perform-
ance, they must be both valuable and permanent. 
Slight expenditures for repairs and the like, such as 
might naturally be made by any person as incident 
to an occupation of the premises, are insufficient." 
And citing Johnston v. Baldock, 201 P. 654, 83 Okl. 285: 
"Improvements relied on in connection with posses-
sion must be both valuable and permanent to take 
an oral land sale contract out of the statute of 
frauds." 
And a Utah case: 
"In action to quiet title to real property wherein de-
fense was that defendant was in possession pursuant 
to parol gift, evidence that defendant made expendi-
tures upon real estate was not sufficient to take case 
out of statute of frauds even had defendant definite-
ly proven promise to give her the property, wh~ere 
value of defendant's free use of the property exceed-
ed amount allegedly spent for imp,rovem,ents." (bold 
face ours) Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 U. 482, 214 P. 308. 
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(d) Second Cause of Action was Barred by Statute 
of Limitations and Statute of Frauds. 
Under Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action filed some 
seven months after the First Cause of Action, they seek to 
have 221j2 shares of Sevier Valley Canal Company water 
stock transferred by defendants to them, under an alleged 
oral contract made during the year 1942. Defendants admit-
ted a certain transaction took place between the parties 
whereby the plaintiffs conveyed to defendants 35 acres of 
real property in Sevier County, Utah, with 171;-2 shares of 
Elsinore Irrigation Canal Company water, in consideration 
for which defendants conveyed to plaintiff Celeste Christen-
sen, 15 acres of real property in Sevier County, Utah, and 
further assumed and paid the Federal Land Bank of Berke-
ley some $2300.00 which the plaintiffs owed under a mort-
gage, the payment of which released their home and farm 
and 11112 shares of water stock in the Sevier Valley Canal 
Company. But defendants specifically denied they had ever 
agreed to transfer 22¥2 shares of water in said Sevier Val-
ley Canal Company as part of said exchange agreement. 
Defendants contend the evidence was insufficient to 
support such contention of plaintiffs and to prove the exis-
tence of the contract, and in their answer alleged the same 
was barred by the statute of limitations. Section 78-12-25 
(1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads: 
" ( 1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liabil-
ity not founded upon an instrument in writing; *** 
(etc.) pr10vided, that action in all of the foregoing 
cases may be commenced at any time within four 
years after the last charge is made or the last pay-
ment is received." 
Plaintiffs' right of action accrued in 1942 when the ex-
change agreement was made and consummated as to all of 
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the deeds and exchanges actually made between the parties. --
Now they cannot come back some 14 years later and ask for 
specific performance. The case of Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 U. 
419, 427, 37 P. 589, applies 2 Comp. Laws 1888, which differs 
little from the present section 78-12-25. Under this section 
an action for specific performance of an alleged verbal con-
tract to transfer certain shares of mining stock upon which 
right of action accrued in 1884, was barred for not having 
been commenced until 1892. 
It is inconceivable that the defendant, Emeron Christen-~ 
sen would pay the water taxes upon this water (as his testi- .· 
mony shows during the 14 years in question) if the water 
belonged to plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had the right to, 
the transfer of the same . 
. POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RE-
QUESTING AND RECEIVING FROM PLAINTIFFS' 
COUNSEL, LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF EVI-
DENCE AFTER THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION WAS 
CONCLUDED, AND OBJECTED TO BY COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANTS. 
Defendants contend that it was highly irregular for the 
Court to request and receive from the plaintiffs' counsel, the 
letter of May 14, 1958 (R 173-4) in which valuations were 
submitted by plaintiffs as to the land and water rights in-
volved as well as inf.ormation pertaining to the Federal Land 
Bank loan of plaintiffs, and the letter of May 23, 1958 
(R 176) in which counsel for plaintiffs again submits valua-
tions in response to the Court's request and in order to get 
the matter determined and settled. 
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The Court has by a certificate stated that such letters 
were not taken into consideration in making a decision in 
the action, but it is a matter of record that his Decision was 
made on May 29, 1958, some six days after the letter of May 
23, 1958, submitted by plaintiffs' counsel. And defendants 
contend that such procedure by the Court was irregular and 
prejudicial to the defendants in this action. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendants assert that for all the reasons set forth 
herein and above, the lower Court committed error in deny-
ing their Motion for a New Trial, and submit that said 
Court, pursuant to Rule 59 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, should have made new Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment in Defendants' favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants can conceive of no possible way the court 
could have held for the plaintiffs in this action. 
First, the existence of the agreements constituting the 
oral contracts were never sufficiently proved. 
Second, specific performance could not be granted, even 
if proof of the contracts was sufficient, by reason of the 
uncertainty, indefiniteness and ambiguity of the terms as 
set forth by the plaintiffs. 
Third, it does not appear that plaintiffs position is such 
that an action at law for damages would not have afforded 
them adequate relief. 
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Fourth, the alleged oral contracts are clearly within the 
statute of frauds and not enforceable if they exist at all. 
There was no memorandum in writing or no part perform-
ance sufficiently proved to take the contracts out of the 
statute, and plaintiffs have not suffered loss or damage hav-
ing been full om ensated by the use of the propert from 
42 to 1955 inclusive, having received the crops and inoome 
therefrom during said years, and any payments allegedly 
made by them for taxes and improvements during such years 
would be far less than the income received, and would in fact 
be less' than a fair rental value for the use of the premises. 
Accordingly defendants assert the decision rendered by 
the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. VERNON ERICKSON, 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants. 
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